Formalising artisanal and small-scale mining:insights, contestations and clarifications by Hilson, G. & Maconachie, Roy
        
Citation for published version:
Hilson, G & Maconachie, R 2017, 'Formalising artisanal and small-scale mining: insights, contestations and
clarifications', Area, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 443–451. https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12328
DOI:
10.1111/area.12328
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Hilson, G., & Maconachie, R. (2017). Formalizing
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Insights, Contestations and Clarifications. Area, which has been published in
final form at AREA. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and
Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 24. Dec. 2019
1 
 
Formalizing Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Insights, 
Contestations and Clarifications 
 
Gavin Hilson and Roy Maconachie 
Abstract 
In recent years, a number of academic analyses have emerged which reflect critically on why most 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) activities–low tech, labour-intensive, mineral extraction and 
processing– occur in informal ‘spaces’. This body of scholarship, however, is heavily disconnected from 
work being carried out by policymakers and donors who, recognizing the growing economic 
importance of ASM in numerous rural sections of the developing world, are now working to identify   
ways in which to facilitate the formalization of its activities. It has rather drawn mostly on theories of 
informality that have been developed around radically different, and in many cases, incomparable, 
experiences, as well as largely redundant ideas, to contextualize phenomena in the sector. This paper 
reflects critically on the implications of this widening gulf, with the aim of facilitating a better 
alignment of scholarly debates on ASM’s informality with overarching policy/donor objectives. The 
divide must be reconciled if the case for formalizing ASM is to be strengthened, and policy is to be 
reformulated to reflect more accurately the many dimensions of the sector’s operations. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, several studies (e.g. Geenen, 2012; Spiegel, 2015; Verbrugge, 2015) have drawn 
attention to how most artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)–labour-intensive, low-tech mineral 
extraction and processing–occurs in informal ‘spaces’.  This body of literature offers a glimpse of the 
day-to-day operations of this industry, as well as the livelihoods of the eclectic group of individuals 
who depend on it.  It also reinforces the importance of the sector: how it produces a significant share 
of the world’s minerals; employs tens of millions of people directly, creates millions of more jobs in 
the downstream industries it spawns; and has become a driver of economic development in numerous 
rural economies (Table 1).   
 
The push to formalize ASM has never been greater.  Several donors, foremost the World Bank and 
various departments of the United Nations, are now pressuring governments across Asia, Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa to make the sector more of a centrepiece of their development 
strategies. This stems largely from growing recognition of ASM’s economic impact, the need to gain 
greater control of its sprawling activities, and the importance of putting regulators in an improved 
position to tackle the host of environmental problems and social ‘ills’, including child labour and health 
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and safety concerns, commonly associated with activities (see e.g. Hentschel et al., 2002; UNEP, 2012).  
But overhauling a development policy ‘machinery’ designed, for the most part, with little 
consideration of the many functions of ASM, promises to be exceedingly challenging.  For host 
governments to be in any position to actively pursue an agenda of ASM formalization, they must 
acquire the information needed to make effective decisions.  This includes data which further 
legitimize the sector’s economic importance and details about why its activities mostly occur in 
informal ‘spaces’. 
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Table 1: Employment estimates for ASM, and minerals extracted, in selected developing countries 
Country Directly Working 
in ASM 
Estimated 
Number of 
Dependents 
Main minerals mined on a small and  
artisanal scale 
Angola 150,000 900,000 Diamonds 
Argentina 5,800 34,800 Gold 
Bolivia 72,000 432,000 Gold 
Brazil 250,000 1,500,000 Gold, diamonds, gemstones 
Burkina Faso 200,000 1,000,000 Gold 
Central African Republic 400,000 2,400,000 Gold, diamonds 
Chad 100,000 600,000 Gold 
Chile 12,000 72,000 Gold, copper, silver 
China 15,000,000 90,000,000 Gold, coal, construction materials (sand) 
Colombia 200,000 1,200,000 Gold, gemstones 
Côte d’Ivoire 100,000 600,000 Gold, diamonds 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
200,000 1,200,000 Diamonds, gold, coltan 
Ecuador 92,000 552,000 Gold 
Eritrea 400,000 2,400,000 Gold 
Ethiopia 500,000 3,000,000 Gold 
French Guiana 10,000 60,000 Gold 
Ghana 1,100,000 4,400,000 Gold, diamonds, sand 
Guinea 300,000 1,500,000 Gold, diamonds 
Guyana 20,000 120,000 Gold, diamonds 
India 500,000 3,000,000 Gold, tin, coal, gemstones 
Indonesia 109,000 654,000 Gold,  
Liberia 100,000 600,000 Gold, diamonds 
Madagascar 500,000 2,500,000 Coloured gemstones, gold 
Malawi 40,000  240,000 Coloured gemstones, gold 
Mali 400,000 2,400,000 Gold 
Mongolia 120,000 720,000 Gold, fluorspar, coal 
Mozambique 100,000 1,200,000 Coloured gemstones, gold 
Myanmar 14,000 84,000 Gold, tin, jade, coloured gemstones 
Niger 450,000 2,700,000 Gold 
Nigeria 500,000 2,500,000 Gold 
PNG 60,000 360,000 Gold 
Peru 30,000 180,000 Gold 
Philippines 300,000 1,800,000 Gold 
South Africa 20,000 120,000 Gold 
Sierra Leone 300,000 1,800,000 Gold, diamonds, coltan 
South Sudan 200,000 1,200,000 Gold 
Sri Lanka 165,000 990,000 Gold, coloured gemstones 
Suriname 20,000 120,000 Gold 
Tanzania 1,500,000 9,000,000 Coloured gemstones, gold, diamonds 
Uganda 150,000 900,000 Gold 
Venezuela 40,000 240,000 Gold, coltan 
Zimbabwe 500,000 3,000,000 Gold, diamonds, coloured gemstones 
Sources: Data extracted from ILO (1999), Dreschler (2001), Mutemeri and Petterson (2002), and Hinton (2005)  
 
Recent academic analysis has failed to cast much light on this.  Heavily disconnected from the policy 
and donor dialogue, this body of literature typically uses theories of informality–conceived around 
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very different and in some cases, incomparable, experiences and contexts–to explain phenomena in 
ASM.  Moreover, when discussing ‘access’ to land, it creates the impression that there are pluralist 
systems in place that must be unravelled, hastily grouping all property rights together.  Many recent 
assessments of informality in ASM, therefore, are little more than ‘snapshots’ of the current state of 
selected operations.  There is, consequently, now a marked difference between how several scholars 
have interpreted informality in ASM on the one hand, and the way in which the sector’s formalization 
challenge has been conceptualized in donor and policymaking circles on the other hand.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to reflect critically on the implications of this growing gulf, with the aim 
of facilitating a better alignment of scholarly debates on ASM’s informality with overarching policy 
objectives.   The next section of the paper unpacks the literature on informality in the ASM sector, in 
the process highlighting this disconnection.   The third section of the paper attempts to bring clarity 
to the debate by drawing on experiences from Guyana, one of the few ‘successful’ cases of ASM 
formalization.  The paper concludes by providing direction for future research on informality in the 
ASM sector. 
 
Informal Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining ‘Spaces’ 
There is growing intrigue surrounding the ways in which informal ASM ‘spaces’ develop.  As 
mentioned, however, despite sharing details about the structures of ASM communities and those who 
populate them, most recent critiques of the sector’s informality are disconnected from the policy 
agenda.  These analyses, therefore, could misguide donors and governments. 
 
There is a wealth of evidence that points to ASM having long been an integral and embedded 
component of a host of local livelihood structures and economic systems.  Most of this analysis focuses 
on sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting, in particular, the linkages between subsistence/smallholder 
agriculture and ASM.  The connections between these activities have become even more ‘visible’ in 
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an era of globalization.  This is owed heavily to the changes ushered in during the region’s period of 
protracted structural adjustment (UNECA, 2003; Banchirigah and Hilson, 2010).  In several African 
countries, radical policy changes were made, moves which would diminish the economic viability of 
smallholder farming considerably.  For many millions of affected households, ASM has become the 
primary income-earning activity.   
 
Similar phenomena have been reported elsewhere in the developing world.  For example, near Edie 
Creek in Mount Kaindi, Papua New Guinea, a country where hundreds of thousands of men and 
women are engaged in artisanal gold mining, Moretti (2006) observed that ‘the area is occupied by 
over two thousand people scattered in a myriad of settlements of between just one to over forty 
households, who live from alluvial and hard-rock mining supplemented by small trade and a limited 
degree of subsistence agriculture’ (p. 136).  Similarly, in Northwestern Kalimantan, Indonesia, another 
country rich in gold, Peluso (2016) reports that ‘small-scale mining has filled what we might call the 
“smallholder slot”’, and is today a ‘smallholder pursuit that has more than filled the subsistence gap 
for many agrarian households’ (p. 37).  This mirrors what appears to be taking place in some sections 
of the Philippines, where, as Almaden (2015) reports, ‘Households who are dependent on mining 
usually find supplementary income through farming, and the families who are engaged in farming also 
find supplementary income through mining’ (p. 355).   
 
This body of analysis has reinforced the view that ASM is largely a ‘poverty-driven’ activity and has 
inseparable connections with farming.  To move hastily beyond analysis of ASM-agricultural linkages 
and the ‘poverty-driven’ narrative, as Fisher et al. (2009) and Verbrugge (2016) suggest must happen, 
could derail what little momentum there is, at present, in policymaking circles to formalize ASM.  
Although as indicated, donors and host governments seem genuinely interested in formalizing the 
sector, most seem reluctant to take immediate action, possibly because they are unsure about how 
to proceed.   
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Development strategy is transfixed on agriculture, particularly the view that intensified support for 
farming can alleviate rural poverty.  Whilst this approach has proved popular in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Banchirigah and Hilson, 2010), there is evidence that it has also shaped policy in a host of other 
developing countries (Byerlee et al., 2005), including the Philippines (World Bank, 2014), Indonesia 
(Rosegrant and Hazel, 2000; Armas et al., 2012), Nicaragua, Peru, Colombia and Brazil (World Bank, 
2009).  It would seem, therefore, that given this focus, one possible way of rapidly legitimizing moves 
and mobilizing sceptical donors to support efforts to formalize ASM–at least in the short term–would 
be to build a case around how the sector sustains agriculture.  Embracing Verbrugge’s (2016) call for 
‘Transcending this narrow focus on farming’ (p. 109) could prevent this from happening. 
 
Verbrugge (2016) also inexplicably declares that ‘The reigning image of ASM is that of a sector 
composed primarily of poverty-driven miners involved in artisanal and subsistence-oriented mining 
activities’ (p. 113), when in policymaking and donor circles, it is precisely the opposite.  The impetus 
behind research aimed at articulating more clearly ASM’s linkages with farming and/or validating that 
many of its activities are ‘poverty-driven’ has been to challenge the prevailing view that the sector is 
populated exclusively by entrepreneurs.  Claims made by Fisher (2008), Verbrugge and Besmanos 
(2016) and others that ASM communities are heterogeneous in their composition, populated by 
enterprising businessmen and individuals with skills, are by no means a revelation.  They reinforce 
what researchers have been drawing attention to, both implicitly and explicitly, for many years (see 
e.g. Hilson and Maponga, 2004; Van Bockstael, 2014).  Scholars are not arguing that ASM is solely 
poverty-driven and subsistence-oriented, as Verbrugge (2016) implies.  They are rather demonstrating 
that there are many individuals who fall into this category, most of whom work alongside skilled and 
semi-skilled groups.   
 
7 
 
An even greater concern is that scholars’ disconnection from policy objectives is needlessly 
complicating debates on ASM’s informality.   Lahiri-Dutt (2014) argues that ‘Informality is the defining 
condition of the everyday lives of peasants in extractive industries, and intersects with illegality, but 
the two are not the same’ (p. 10).  Both the policymaker and donor, however, would argue otherwise.  
Although not always stated explicitly, as captured by the excerpts below, for most donors and host 
governments, formalization of ASM entails legalization and the steps required to put individuals in a 
position to secure the requisite permits: 
 ‘As ASM can hardly ever be formalized under the same legal schemes applicable for 
large scale mining, existing special legal provisions for formalizing ASM should be 
resumed; also in case that no special provisions exist for ASM, this fact needs to be 
clearly pointed out’. [World Bank, 2004, p. 40] 
 ‘Formalization is a process that seeks to integrate ASGM [artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining] into the formal economy. The process of formalization includes the 
development or adaptation of mining (and other) laws or policies to address the 
challenges of ASGM’. [UNEP, 2012, p. 1] 
 ‘In addition to simplifying registration procedures, the government should encourage 
small-scale and artisanal miners to formalize their activities by enhancing the 
advantages of legalization and by using incentives such as training and technical 
assistance’. [ILO, 1999] 
 
This view began to take shape in the 1990s, when several governments began to implement new–and 
in some cases, revised–regulatory frameworks for ASM.  A more nuanced understanding of the 
context in which these laws were passed would provide greater clarity on what donors and 
governments now perceive as ‘informal’ ASM, and ultimately, the issues scholars should be taking 
stock of in their critiques when prescribing recommendations to policymakers. 
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The first step is understanding and accepting why so many individuals choose to work in informal ASM 
‘spaces’.   The answer lies in the blueprint followed for mining sector reform.  To encourage foreign 
investment in large-scale mining and mineral exploration, a series of countries, ‘initially in Latin 
America and then in Africa and Asia, implemented processes of mining sector reform along the Iines 
pioneered by Chile [in the early-1980s]’ (World Bank, 2003, p. 2).  Backed by the World Bank and IMF, 
host governments have made sweeping changes to mineral policy, including providing generous 
investment incentives such as tax breaks and guaranteeing investors access to large concessions for 
lengthy periods, to catalyze inflows of foreign capital.  It is well known to most that ASM has not 
featured prominently in these processes.   
 
Regulatory frameworks have been implemented for ASM but most were designed with the view that 
those found operating at sites are enterprising businessmen.  This is an unsurprising development in 
light of the advice provided by the World Bank officials who have guided the mining sector reform 
process over the years.  In the Bank’s A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean (World 
Bank, 1996), for example, it was recommended that ‘any policy to help develop a national mining 
industry must look at ways of integrating artisanal mining into the formal sector, primarily by 
encouraging the more entrepreneurial among them to move up to become small miners’ (p. 50).  
Similarly, in A Strategy for African Mining, Bank officials recommend that ‘new policy frameworks 
should eliminate distinctions between small and large-scale mining so as to encourage all potential 
interested parties’ (p. 22).  The result has been predictable: how in most countries, people struggle to  
comply with specific procedures, including those attached to bureaucratic permitting systems and 
regulatory processes more suitable for large-scale operators, that must now be followed to obtain 
small-scale mining licenses.  This led officials at the International Labour Organization to declare that 
ASM is ‘bedevilled with too many regulations that are mostly designed to constrain it’ (ILO, 1999, np).  
Several authors (e.g. Geenen, 2012; Van Bockstael, 2014) have since reinforced this claim, drawing 
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attention to the specific barriers preventing individuals from securing the legal rights to access 
informal ASM ‘spaces’ and the host of benefits that comes with legalization. 
 
A growing number of scholars, however, have dismissed the policy context entirely.  They have rather  
formulated their own ideas to explain ASM-specific phenomena but significantly, draw on points 
which have little relevance when overarching policy objectives are considered.  An initial point that 
requires clarification here has already been raised, namely the belief that there are conflicting land 
tenure systems.   This was a topic which a reviewer of this paper took particular issue with, explaining 
that ‘There is also a large literature on plural tenure regimes and customary rights which the author 
dismisses in their critique of handful of ASM studies. A much fuller and more robust critique is 
required. This should clearly elucidates the weaknesses of the studies criticised not simply state them 
as weak’.  This, however, leads to the main objective of the present paper: to clarify how, when the 
details of the policy context are considered, there is very little need to pay attention to what is 
increasingly being misdiagnosed as ‘plural tenure regimes and customary rights’.  The reviewer is 
correct in implying that there are, indeed, legitimate concerns over subsurface and surface rights in 
several developing countries.  But the purpose of mining sector reform is to facilitate access to, and 
to further legitimize host government’s control of, the former solely for economic gain.  As Blanc 
(2015) explains, drawing on experiences from sub-Saharan Africa, ‘the mining title is a special type of 
superior immovable property right which overrides rights that the land owner or other third parties 
may hold in respect of the land surface covered by the mining title, such as farming, hunting, 
agricultural rights, land occupation or even land ownership rights and easements that also qualify as 
immovable property rights’, and that ‘In case of such conflict, the mining title must always prevail’ (p. 
331). 
   
Recent scholarship on the formalization of ASM seems to have lost sight of this.  On the one hand, 
perhaps the reviewer of this paper is justified in stating that ‘the papers [critiqued here by the authors] 
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do not necessarily aim to link practice with policy and should therefore be judged against their stated 
aims rather than what the author thinks they should be doing’.  But on the other hand, this is the 
purpose of the article, as well as to draw attention to the sizable gulf between how formalization of 
ASM has been diagnosed by donors and certain academics.  The article illustrates very clearly how 
disconnected the latter are from the former’s views and interpretations.  A case in point is, once again, 
Verbrugge (2015), who concludes that his study on ‘informal’ ASM in the Philippines ‘can be read as 
an invitation for policy makers to think of more inclusive approaches to formalizing ASM, which aim 
to transcend the currently dominant and rather narrow focus on mineral tenure, by also considering 
strategies to recognize and protect the interests of the massive workforce’ (p. 1043).  When the policy 
position is taken into consideration, however, the author’s recommendations become redundant 
because for developing world governments and donors, once again, formalization is exclusively about 
mineral tenure, in this case, titling for ASM.    
 
A second point concerns the effectiveness of the ASM formalization process altogether.  It is hardly a 
revelation that, to date, efforts to bring operators into the legal domain have been noticeably 
lacklustre, and that many who have made this transition claim to have not realized tangible benefits 
from their move.  But rather than ask why this is the case for ASM, scholars have elected to focus their 
analysis on what Geenen (2012) labels the limitations of ‘the formalization discourse’, or the idea that 
formalization ‘assumes that everyone will eventually benefit from strong property rights’ (p. 323), a 
point reinforced by Verbrugge and Besmanos (2016).  A likely reason why, ‘despite their lack of formal 
titles they [small-scale miners] may have customary titles, which are just as strong in their eyes, and 
even more legitimate’ (Geenen, 2012, p. 326), is that these property rights are not ‘strong’.  With 
large-scale extraction, which again, has the full backing of politicians in most areas of the developing 
world, mining titles are illustrative examples of what Blanc (2015) would consider ‘unique’ and 
‘superior’.  As ASM is not prioritized in reform, however, it is unsurprising that corresponding efforts 
have failed to produce comparative ‘unique’ and ‘superior’ titles and ultimately transform the informal 
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‘spaces’ its activities are confined to.  The ‘many other resource users’ observed to possess ‘a “bundle 
of rights” to the land’ (Freudenberger et al., 2011, p. 3), therefore, should be seen as products of 
ASM’s low level of policy treatment as opposed to a genuine ‘overlapping’ of claims.  With a similar 
level of political commitment to that afforded to large-scale mining, would these outcomes even 
arise? 
 
A final point concerns the cavalier way in which recent scholarship reflects on theories of informality 
to explain phenomena in ASM.  The three main schools of thought are as follows:  the dualists, who 
argue that informal activities have few (if any) linkages to the formal economy; the structuralists, who 
see the informal and formal economies as connected, the latter at times exploiting the former; and 
the legalists, who believe that micro-entrepreneurs choose to operate informally in order to avoid 
excessive bureaucracy and costs, and need property rights to legitimize their assets (Chen, 2007).  
These explanations, however, emerged at very different periods in history, developed around 
subsistence commodities, and drew mostly on experiences from urban as opposed to rural settings to 
explain specific phenomena.  Moreover, neither was formulated with a view to contextualizing the 
dynamics of a sector as unique and complex as ASM.  But this has not stopped scholars from hastily 
applying these ideas to this sector, and at times prematurely drawing conclusions about their 
appropriateness and reliability.  These theories unquestionably broach some ideas that could help to 
contextualize ASM.  But given the very different supply chains, highly-valuable commodities, specific 
governance frameworks and sets of actors associated with this sector, each must be critically 
unpacked and adapted appropriately.          
 
The Case of Guyana 
Having established that for donors and policymakers, ‘formalization’ in the context of ASM is seen as 
‘legalization’ and the steps that must be taken for this to happen, this section of the paper builds on 
key points raised thus far by drawing on experiences from Guyana.  One of few countries that openly 
12 
 
supports small-scale miners, Guyana demonstrates how, with the requisite levels of assistance, 
formalization can be effective.  It furthermore illustrates the power that mining titles–in this case, 
Small-Scale Mining Permits and Medium-Scale Mining Licenses–wield, and how, when prioritized, 
formalization establishes or in this case, fortifies, a legalized and supported sector. 
 
Guyana’s bureaucratic structures have always been organized around promoting and supporting ASM. 
Like most gold-rich developing countries, it has a lengthy history of ASM, which began in the 1880s.  It 
was at this point when bands of artisanal operators, called pork-knockers,1 produced most of the-then 
colony’s gold using basic tools.  The legal framework for formalized ASM ‘spaces’ was established a 
century later, following passage of the new Mining Act, 1989.  It established procedures for a Small-
Scale Mining Claim (1500ft X 800ft) and a Medium Scale Mining Permit, both of which are reserved 
for Guyanese nationals, and can only be secured by those in possession of a Prospecting License.  
Moreover, as Bridge (2007) explains, the Act also liberalized the Guyana Gold Board (the state gold 
buying agency), and provided a wealth of investment incentives for miners of all types, a move that 
would catalyze the opening of the US$300 million Omai mine in 1993.  Whilst Guyana would play host 
to countless Junior exploration companies up until the mid-1990s, a precipitous decline in the gold 
price would effectively bring this activity to a grinding halt.  As the only operational gold mine in the 
country at the time, Omai would be allowed to run its course, closing officially in 2005. 
 
In the 1980s, Guyana found itself in a similar position as the Philippines, where, as Verbrugge (2015) 
explains, the large-scale mining sector broke down following the collapse of the Marcos regime, which 
supported multinationals such as Atlas and Lepanto.  Verbrugge and Besmanos (2016) reflect on how 
several ‘seemingly uncoordinated efforts’, including implementation of the People’s Small-Scale 
Mining Act (RA 7076), have since been made to ‘formalize’ ASM in areas of the Philippines, including 
                                                          
1 Guyana’s alluvial gold miners earned the name pork-knockers in reference to their diet of pickled pork, often 
consumed at the end of a day’s work. 
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(presumably) the territories vacated by large-scale operators.  But whereas the Government of 
Guyana was unwilling to cede mining territories to foreign multinationals following implementation 
of the Mining Act, 1989, the Philippines did not abandon the idea, even during times of depressed 
gold prices when large-scale extraction was not particularly viable.  This could explain the ‘seemingly 
uncoordinated efforts’ to formalize ASM which Verbrugge and Besmanos (2016) refer to.  The authors’ 
accounts of the recent conflicts that have unfolded in the T’boli municipality of the country between 
ASM operators (and suspension of their activities in 2010) and the large-scale miner, Tribal Mining 
Corporation, could be interpreted as failure of government to prioritize the needs of the former during 
this lag period.  As Verbrugge (2015) himself concedes, referencing Camba (2015), ‘RA 7076 and 
related efforts to regulate the sector have largely failed to materialize, so that most ASM takes place 
informally…One of the key reasons for the persistence of informality [being]…the shift towards a 
“neoliberal mining regime” that prioritizes the expansion of large-scale, capital intensive mining’ (p. 
111). 
 
This leads to the first reason why the Government of Guyana has been able to prevent the 
proliferation of informal ASM ‘spaces’.  Unlike the Philippines, it has, since the mid-1990s, made the 
formalization of ASM a centrepiece of its development strategy.  To be clear, however, the motivation 
for doing so was that, under the circumstances, it seemed to be the most effective strategy for a rent-
seeking government.  This contrasts sharply with the Philippines, where it seems that the ‘seemingly 
uncoordinated efforts’ to formalize ASM enabled elites to continue rent-seeking during periods of 
depressed gold prices whilst keeping the door open for large-scale mining.   
 
Given Guyana’s long history of indigenous, family-financed and connected gold mining activity, much 
of it spanning many generations, the authorities elected to appease local elites.  The Guyana 
Geological and Mines Commission (GGMC) and its regional offices, therefore, have expended 
considerable energy over the past two decades helping these individuals acquire plots.  Additional 
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guidance is provided by the sector’s powerful and influential mouthpiece, the Guyana Gold and 
Diamond Miners Association (GGDMA).  Established in 1982, the GGDMA has an extensive 
membership, which collectively produces 90 percent of Guyana’s minerals and features 20 of the 
country’s top 25 gold producers of the past decade.2  The aforementioned Guyana Gold Board is ever-
present, offering purchasing services to miners, levying a 2 percent tax and 5 percent royalty on all 
gold collected.  It manages to collect an estimated 75 percent of all gold mined in the country.  
 
This lead to the second reason: the effectiveness of the policy framework for ASM.  Unlike other 
countries, Guyana has not made cost or bureaucracy impediments to formalizing.  The permitting 
process is fairly streamlined, beginning with the Prospecting License, the application for which costs 
US$100; preparation of a Work Program; submission of a cartographic description of the area; and 
preparation of a map on a Terra Survey sheet. If there are no objections following a brief ‘gazetting’ 
period, the application is then forwarded to the country capital, Georgetown, for ministerial approval, 
and takes effect once payment of a series of rather negligible rental fees are made.3 Following a 
mineral discovery, the application for a Small-Scale Mining Claim or Medium-Scale Mining License can 
be initiated.  This entire process is supported by the GGMC, initially through its local offices, and the 
GGDMA throughout.  To keep this cycle going, the GGMC even periodically auctions ‘available’ gold-
mineralized territories in the country’s vast interior. All licenses can be renewed annually but perhaps 
more importantly, indefinitely, providing security of tenure at a level enjoyed by few other ASM 
operators worldwide.  
 
The third and final point concerns the power these mining titles wield.  With the backing of the 
government, both types of permit trump all other property rights, including indigenous Amerindian 
                                                          
2 ‘Guyana Gold & Diamond Miners Association, History & Purpose’ http://guyanaminers.com/site-
page/history-purpose (Accessed 12 September 2016). 
3 ‘Guyana Geology and Mines Commission’, http://www.ggmc.gov.gy/main/?q=divisions/land-
management#apml (Accessed 12 August 2016). 
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entitlements.  The Amerindian Act 2006 has made it mandatory for holders of new claims located 
within Amerindian titled lands to dialogue with the corresponding ‘captain’ (chief) and to pay a royalty 
(generally 7-10 percent) on production but those who secured their permits before 2006 are not 
obliged to do so.  The Government of Guyana’s handling of Amerindian affairs has, indeed, been 
questionable and perhaps unethical.  Yet, at the same time, the case of Guyana illustrates how, in line 
with Blanc (2015), an ASM license can also be a ‘superior immovable property right which overrides 
rights that the land owner or other third parties may hold in respect of the land surface covered by 
the mining title’ (p. 331). 
 
Guyana’s formalized ASM ‘spaces’ today produce 91 percent of the country’s gold.  The pork-knocking 
activity once widespread still exists but mostly in these ‘spaces’, made possible by deals forged with 
the concession holder.  The government’s ongoing efforts to formalize ASM has catalyzed gold 
production: between 2005 and 2006, following the closure of Omai, output dropped from 262,528 to 
204,970 oz but has since nearly doubled, reaching 450,873 oz in 2015 (Thomas, 2009; Bank of Guyana, 
2015).  The case of Guyana casts light on what–in this case, for policymakers–formalization means in 
the context of ASM, and what can be accomplished, developmentally, if it is viewed as a priority 
national objective.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has weighed in on emerging debates on informality in ASM.  Specifically, it drew attention 
to the sizable gulf between how a recent wave of scholarly analysis has defined ‘informality’ in the 
context of ASM on the one hand, and how ‘formalization’ of the sector has been interpreted in 
policymaking and donor circles on the other hand.  This is owed to the former being heavily 
disconnected from the latter, a gap that can only be bridged with greater alignment of academic 
research with the policy context. 
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The paper has highlighted two significant points.  The first concerns the abovementioned disconnect.  
In addition to failing to recognize that, in the context of ASM, policymakers and donors interpret 
formalization as legalization, scholars have not explored why the ASM space itself is informal or how 
to legitimize, in the eyes of the law, associated mineral rights.  Such research would inevitably connect 
with the host of analysis carried out in recent decades which explains why individuals in the sector 
choose to operate without the requisite permits.  The analysis put forward by these scholars, however, 
tends to focus on the labour and structures of the ‘space’ itself, drawing on theories of informality, 
wholesale, to contextualize unrelated phenomena.  When taking into account the policy and donor 
context, this analysis offers very little guidance on how to tackle the sector’s many development 
challenges. 
 
The second point concerns theories of informality in view of how policymakers and donors interpret 
the ASM formalization exercise.  Informality in this sector, it would seem, aligns most closely to the 
legalist school on informality, more specifically, the ideas of Hernando De Soto (De Soto, 2000, 2002).  
The formalization blueprint prescribed by De Soto is nowhere close to being an exact science.  But 
many of his–largely implicit–views, in particular, how bureaucracy ‘creates’ informality and with the 
requisite political backing, unlicensed economic activities can be legalized, have bearing here.  
Referring back to the Guyana case, is the titling now promoted by the government, which has 
facilitated holders’ access to bank loans, equipment and technical support, the ‘strong’ ASM rights 
that Geenen (2012) suggests is missing in so many countries and which Verbrugge (2015) claims to be 
so elusive?     
 
More research is needed which casts light on the formalization challenge in the ASM sector.  But if it 
is to have any traction in policy, scholars must align their work with what host governments and 
donors are trying to achieve.  
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